SUMMARY--Increases fee allowed for appointed attorneys and compensation allowed for certain other persons in cases involving death penalty and repeals limitation on time in which opinion must be rendered by supreme court pursuant to appeal from judgment of death. (BDR 1-838)
FISCAL NOTE: Effect on Local Government: Yes.
Effect on the State or on Industrial Insurance: Yes.
EXPLANATION - Matter in italics is new; matter in brackets [ ] is material to be omitted.
AN ACT relating to the death penalty; increasing the hourly fee payable to an attorney appointed in a case involving the death penalty; increasing the compensation payable to a person furnishing investigative, expert or other services to the defense in a case involving the death penalty; repealing the limitation on time in which an opinion must be rendered by the supreme court pursuant to an appeal from a judgment of death; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1 NRS 7.125 is hereby amended to read as follows:
7.125 1. [Except as limited by subsections 2, 3 and 4, an] An attorney , other than a public defender , who is appointed by a magistrate or a district court to represent or defend a defendant at any stage of the criminal proceedings from the defendant's initial appearance before the magistrate or the district court through the appeal, if any, is entitled to receive a fee , pursuant to the provisions of this section, for court appearances and other time reasonably spent on the matter to which the appointment is made . [, $75 per hour.]
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an attorney who is appointed to represent or defend a defendant is entitled to receive a fee of $75 per hour.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 4, if a defendant's most serious crime is a felony punishable by death, an attorney who is appointed to represent or defend the defendant is entitled to receive a fee of $115 per hour. If the prosecution does not seek the death penalty or abandons seeking the death penalty during the proceedings, an attorney who is appointed to represent or defend the defendant is entitled to receive a fee of $75 per hour beginning on the date that the prosecution informs the court that it is not seeking the death penalty or is abandoning seeking the death penalty.
4. If a defendant is convicted of a felony punishable by death and the jury or the panel of judges does not impose a sentence of death upon the defendant after a separate penalty hearing on the issue has been conducted pursuant to NRS 175.552 to 175.562, inclusive, an attorney who is appointed to represent or defend the defendant is entitled to receive a fee of $75 per hour to represent the defendant on appeal.
5. Except for cases in which the most serious crime is a felony punishable by death or by imprisonment for life with or without possibility of parole, this [subsection] section does not preclude a governmental entity from contracting with a private attorney who agrees to provide [such] services for a [lesser] rate of compensation [.
2.] that is less than the rate of compensation set forth in subsection 2.
6. The total fee for each attorney in any matter regardless of the number of offenses charged or ancillary matters pursued must not exceed:
(a) If the most serious crime is a felony punishable by death or by imprisonment for life with or without possibility of parole, $12,000;
(b) If the most serious crime is a felony other than a felony included in paragraph (a) or is a gross misdemeanor, $2,500;
(c) If the most serious crime is a misdemeanor, $750;
(d) For an appeal of one or more misdemeanor convictions, $750; or
(e) For an appeal of one or more gross misdemeanor or felony convictions, $2,500.
[3.] 7. An attorney appointed by a district court to represent an indigent petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus or other post-conviction relief, if the petitioner is imprisoned pursuant to a judgment of conviction of a gross misdemeanor or felony, is entitled to be paid a fee not to exceed $750.
[4.] 8. If the appointing court because of:
(a) The complexity of a case or the number of its factual or legal issues;
(b) The severity of the offense;
(c) The time necessary to provide an adequate defense; or
(d) Other special circumstances,
deems it appropriate to grant a fee in excess of the applicable maximum, the payment must be made, but only if the court in which the representation was rendered certifies that the amount of the excess payment is both reasonable and necessary and the payment is approved by the presiding judge of the judicial district in which the attorney was appointed, or if there is no such presiding judge or if he presided over the court in which the representation was rendered, then by the district judge who holds seniority in years of service in office.
[5.] 9. The magistrate, the district court or the supreme court may, in the interests of justice, substitute one appointed attorney for another at any stage of the proceedings, but the total amount of fees granted all appointed attorneys must not exceed those allowable if but one attorney represented or defended the defendant at all stages of the criminal proceeding.
Sec. 2 NRS 7.135 is hereby amended to read as follows:
7.135 1. The attorney appointed by a magistrate or district court to represent a defendant is entitled, in addition to the fee provided by NRS 7.125 for his services, to be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred by him in representing the defendant and may employ, subject to the prior approval of the magistrate or the district court in an ex parte application, such investigative, expert or other services as may be necessary for an adequate defense. [Compensation to any] Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, compensation to a person furnishing such investigative, expert or other services must not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred . [, unless payment in excess of that limit is:
1.] 2. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, if a defendant's most serious crime is a felony punishable by death, compensation to a person furnishing investigative, expert or other services pursuant to subsection 1 must not exceed $1,000, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. If the prosecution does not seek the death penalty or abandons seeking the death penalty during the proceedings, compensation to a person furnishing investigative, expert or other services pursuant to subsection 1 must not exceed the greater of $300 or the amount already incurred, not to exceed $1,000, on the date that the prosecution informs the court that it is not seeking the death penalty or is abandoning seeking the death penalty, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred.
3. A payment may be made in excess of a limit in subsection 1 or 2 if the payment is:
(a) Certified by the trial judge of the court, or by the magistrate if the services were rendered in connection with a case disposed of entirely before him, as necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration; and
[2.] (b) Approved by the presiding judge of the judicial district in which the attorney was appointed, or if there is no presiding judge, by the district judge who holds seniority in years of service in office.
Sec. 3 NRS 177.267 is hereby repealed.
Sec. 4 The provisions of subsection 1 of NRS 354.599 do not apply to any additional expenses of a local government that are related to the provisions of this act.
TEXT OF REPEALED SECTION
177.267Time within which supreme court shall render opinion on appeal from judgment of death.
1. An appeal to the supreme court from a judgment of death or the review of such a judgment by that court must be decided and an opinion rendered within 150 days after the court has received the record on appeal from the clerk of the sentencing court. If an opinion is not rendered within that time, the chief justice of the supreme court shall state on the record the reasons which caused the delay and the facts supporting those reasons.
2. Any failure of the court to comply with the requirements of this section is not a ground for setting aside the judgment of death.