MINUTES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Sixty-eighth Session April 5, 1995 The Senate Committee on Judiciary was called to order by Chairman Mark A. James, at 8:50 a.m., on Wednesday, April 5, 1995, in Room 224 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster. COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: Senator Mark A. James, Chairman Senator Jon C. Porter, Vice Chairman Senator Maurice Washington Senator Mike McGinness Senator Ernest E. Adler Senator Dina Titus Senator O. C. Lee STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT: Allison Combs, Senior Research Analyst Judy Jacobs, Committee Secretary OTHERS PRESENT: Scott Doyle, District Attorney, Douglas County District Attorney's Office Judge Michael P. Gibbons, Ninth Judicial District, District Courts Terry Sanford, Concerned Citizen Susie McGregor, Concerned Citizen Major Dan Hammack, Nevada Highway Patrol Judy M. Jacoboni, Lobbyist, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, Carson City Division Chiefs, Office of the Attorney General Senator James announced the first draft of the proposed bill prepared by the crime and sentencing subcommittee is complete. He stated, in order to save some publishing costs, there will be hearings and changes made to the draft prior to submitting it as a bill draft request (BDR) due to its volume of over 300 pages. He said hearings on the matter will commence on Tuesday, April 11, 1995. Senator James opened the hearing on Assembly Bill (A.B.) 185. ASSEMBLY BILL 185: Includes within crime of involuntary manslaughter violation of certain laws resulting in another person's death. Scott Doyle, District Attorney, Douglas County District Attorney's Office, pointed out he had not been designated as the spokesperson for the bill, but he offered to explain the purpose and intent of A.B. 185. Mr. Doyle explained involuntary manslaughter under the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) chapter 200 currently is punishable as either a gross misdemeanor or as a felony. He said when negligence has been an element in the state of mind, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the section as gross or criminal negligence. He indicated A.B. 185 will create a second category of involuntary manslaughter which is punishable as a misdemeanor and is confined to a vehicular context by referencing NRS chapters 484 and 706. It will provide that a finding of simple negligence is sufficient as part of the case in order to obtain a conviction. Mr. Doyle stated current involuntary manslaughter statutes do not allow the criminal justice system to recognize the fact a death is involved when charges are being brought in cases regarding vehicular circumstances. He said often the charge in cases involving vehicular fatalities is a motor vehicle code violation which is punishable as a misdemeanor, or it is a commercial code violation which only takes the fact a fatality was involved into consideration at the time of sentencing. Mr. Doyle declared A.B. 185 will allow the criminal justice system to take the fact of fatality into consideration at the time charges are filed as well as at the time of sentencing. Mr. Doyle pointed out members of families who have been involved in such situations were present to explain the importance of the legislation. Senator James asked what is included under a violation of NRS chapter 484 or NRS chapter 706, cited in the bill. Mr. Doyle responded those are motor vehicle codes. He noted there are certain exceptions spelled out on the first two lines on the second page of the bill regarding reckless driving, driving under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI), eluding a police officer or similar offenses, so the new provisions will not be a blanket application. He said existing law regarding gross or criminal negligence, intoxication, or attempts to elude a police officer will not be changed. Senator James inquired what classification will be given to a crime cited under subsection 2 of section 2. Mr. Doyle replied those crimes will be misdemeanors because they would be the result of simple negligence rather than gross or criminal negligence. He said A.B. 185 attempts to differentiate between the degree of blameworthiness or culpability under simple negligence or gross or criminal negligence. He explained now, under simple negligence statutes, only a vehicle code violation will be charged because there is no category for involuntary manslaughter. Mr. Doyle reiterated the purpose is to fill a gap in the criminal code in which a fatality is involved in a vehicular accident and there is no criminal negligence. The measure will allow for recognition of a fatality when a charge is brought by having the misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter charge available. He stated present statutes do not address simple negligence as a crime, a situation which has been in effect for over 20 years following a 1973 opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court. In response to a query by Senator James, Mr. Doyle said California has a provision for misdemeanor manslaughter in the vehicle code context, and he guessed other states have similar statutes. Senator James asked if the proposed statute will apply if no death occurs but injuries render the victim a quadriplegic. Mr. Doyle replied there will be no charge of manslaughter and other vehicle code violations will have to be applied. Senator Lee inquired if there is a fiscal note to A.B. 185. Mr. Doyle replied there may be cases charged under the statute that are currently being dealt with as traffic offenses. He explained a misdemeanor can include incarceration up to 6 months in a county jail and a fine of up to $1,000, or a combination of both. He indicated a fiscal note would probably address the effect of those types of consequences upon local governments. Judge Michael P. Gibbons, Ninth Judicial District, District Courts, related he first became aware of the problem to be addressed by A.B. 185 in 1982 in a case in which a driver turned in front of two motorcyclists who were subsequently killed. He said the citation given the driver was failure to yield, the only available charge the Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP) felt was applicable. The driver paid the bail, thus concluding the case. He stated an attempt to prosecute the driver for manslaughter had to be dropped because the court ruled the driver, after having paid a fine, would have been subject to double jeopardy. He decried the fact though people were killed the driver did not even have to go to court. Judge Gibbons stated there have been several other traffic deaths in ensuing years in which there has been insufficient evidence to bring a charge of manslaughter because the law requires gross negligence, meaning willful or wanton misconduct. Under simple negligence, he said, it must be proven that the driver violated a traffic statute that caused the accident and the driver can be held accountable for manslaughter if he kills someone, which is a misdemeanor, not a felony or gross misdemeanor. Judge Gibbons said, although there is no fiscal impact on the state under those circumstances, there is a big difference in how a court handles a case knowing the real consequences of the act, such as death, as opposed to only being aware of a failure to yield or whatever the violation may have been. He agreed with Mr. Doyle that A.B. 185 will fill a gap in current law. Senator Adler asked if the measure will apply in cases where passengers die as the result of a violation by the driver. Judge Gibbons replied it will address the death of any person other than the driver as a result of a motor vehicle violation, such as in a rollover accident. Judge Gibbons pointed out such cases will not automatically be prosecuted under the charge, there will have to be proof, but A.B. 185 will provide the option which is missing from current law. Senator James inquired what the outcome of such a case might be. Judge Gibbons responded the penalty will not change. He said under state law a misdemeanor traffic violation is punishable by up to 6 months in a county jail and up to $1,000 in fines. He added under certain city and county codes such offenses are treated as infractions with no incarceration. He stated A.B. 185 will provide the same penalty as all other misdemeanors, but primarily it will serve notice to the judge that the matter is serious and the matter will not be handled in the same routine fashion as the thousands of other traffic violations going through the courts. He noted it will provide involvement for the victim which is otherwise lacking. Senator James asked if there is a simple negligence precedent punishable criminally in other situations. Judge Gibbons replied there are very few strict liability laws, that most traffic laws require some sort of fault. He submitted that is the key part of negligence, that carelessness as a fault must be part of the equation as opposed to a strict liability in which there is no fault. He declared the philosophy of the law will not be changed and it will be consistent with current law. Senator James noted there is a causation connection in which, if a person dies as a result of a violation of NRS chapter 484, the traffic infraction must be the cause of the death. He asked if the measure will apply if there is a traffic infraction but it does not cause the accident. Judge Gibbons confirmed the new measure will not apply to such a situation. He stated the causation element is required under current law and it will be included under the revised statute. He acknowledged there may be traffic violations which are not the cause of the accident, and under which there will be no prosecution, such as hit and run, in which case the driver is at fault for leaving, not necessarily for causing an accident. He explained it will have to be shown that the driver did something to cause the accident. Senator Porter asked how contributory negligence will be handled under the proposed new law. Judge Gibbon replied the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the issue of comparative negligence under current law in which the same analysis is used as in civil law in which a comparison must be made as to who is at fault and what is the primary cause of the accident. He stated if the person killed is the major cause of the accident, more comparatively at fault, there is no conviction under present law. He surmised the same will apply under A.B. 185. Senator Porter inquired how existing law applies in a situation in which the victim may be 20 or 30 percent negligent. Judge Gibbons responded in such a situation there will still be a conviction under the "50 percent rule," although the jury will have a great deal of discretion in the matter. He pointed out a jury does not return a verdict attributing a certain amount of fault in a criminal case such as is done in a civil case. He indicated a judge hearing the matter without a jury, or giving instructions to a jury, will have to determine that the defendant was more at fault than the deceased. In order to accommodate Judge Gibbons, Senator James opened the hearing on A.B. 186. ASSEMBLY BILL 186: Revises provisions governing evidence considered at hearing to determine sentence to be imposed on criminal defendant. Judge Gibbons declared, although A.B. 186 is sponsored by Assemblyman Lynn Hettrick, he drew up the original version of the bill and he could represent the assemblyman's position fairly accurately. He explained a law was passed approximately 10 years ago which granted a victim the right to appear in court at a sentencing hearing to express views as to how the crime affected him. He said the definition of victim only allows the person directly impacted by the crime or, if the victim dies, his parent, spouse or child to appear, thus providing only limited representation for the victim. Judge Gibbons explained when a sentencing is held before a court, the defense usually very thoroughly presents the point of view of the defendant as to what the mitigating factors are, the reasons for a lower punishment. He opined equal weight should be given to the victim's side of a crime, which will be accomplished through A.B. 186 by changing the definition of a victim to include other relatives who may give information to the court as to how the victim has been affected by the crime. Judge Gibbons recalled a case in which a person raped a woman and attempted to rape another, but at the sentencing hearing neither woman wanted to appear and face the perpetrator. He said one woman asked her ex-husband, an attorney, to write a letter to describe how the crime had impacted her, while the parents of the other woman wrote a letter describing how she had been affected by the crime. He said the defense objected on the grounds the letters did not come from the victims, after which the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the sentencing, which was a light sentence. However, he said, the court included the admonition that the verdict was erroneous because it did not meet the strict definition of victim and ruled there was harmless error in the particular case. He stated A.B. 186 will allow a personal representative, which, in the cited case, would have allowed the letters from the ex-husband or parents to be taken into consideration. Judge Gibbons called attention to subsection 6 on the second page which he said was added because the language of the supreme court decision is fairly restrictive. He declared A.B. 186 will make it very clear that rights are being given to victims while it will not restrict the court or defendants. Senator James inquired if "personal representative" is defined. Judge Gibbons acknowledged it is not defined and he interprets it to refer to persons designated by the victims to speak on their behalf. Senator James wondered if the wording will allow going beyond the limitation of using members of the bar who are generally those entitled to represent people in court. Judge Gibbons responded: What you have posed here is theoretically possible. There could be somebody that goes around representing victims, a victims' group, but it would still require the victim in that individual case to want to have that person to speak for [him or her]. Senator James pointed out there is already legal counsel to speak on behalf of the victim. Judge Gibbons replied in preparing the rationale accompanying his original bill draft request he pointed out most victims are unable to retain counsel to represent them at sentencing hearings. He asserted victims should not be required to pay an attorney to represent them at sentencing hearings. Senator James expressed hope "personal representative" in the context of the bill will mean persons who are designated in those circumstances by victims to represent them, and not persons holding themselves out as victim representatives in case after case. Judge Gibbons responded the word "personal" is intended to mean a particular person designated by the victim. He commented many victims do not wish to appear, while some are willing to testify fully, but many wish to have a third party appear on their behalf. Senator James resumed the hearing on A.B. 185. Terry Sanford, Concerned Citizen, provided the committee with a photograph and written testimony (Exhibit C) from which he spoke in support of A.B. 185. He described a violent automobile accident that occurred on Highway 395 south of Gardnerville in which two young marines were killed when they crashed into a truck making an alleged illegal U-turn. He introduced the mother and sister of one of the victims. Sarah McGregor, sister of the victim, displayed a photograph of him. Her mother, Susie McGregor, Concerned Citizen, spoke from written testimony (Exhibit D). Ms. McGregor expressed frustration that the owner of the truck had been involved in a similar accident involving negligence once before, in which she charged he "got away with murder." She asserted the driver had once again caused a death for which he was cited with three traffic violations and fined a total of $1,800 with a suspended 6-month jail sentence, "and he got away with it again." Ms. McGregor voiced a feeling of helplessness that there is no statute in Nevada to hold the driver accountable under such circumstances. She urged passage of A.B. 185. Senator Adler inquired if the trucking or driving licenses had been revoked for either of the drivers. Mr. Sanford replied they had not and that the driver is still in business. Ms. McGregor interjected the driver is under investigation by the Nevada Department of Transportation, he has no United States Interstate Commerce Commission number nor a Public Service Commission of Nevada number, yet he still operates within Nevada. Senator Adler declared the trucker should not be operating on local highways without either number. Senator James asked if the incident had been prosecuted in Douglas County and why it had not been pursued as gross negligence. Mr. Doyle confirmed his office had prosecuted the case and explained the Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP) investigation report reflected the accident had taken place at an area with adequate visibility and where U-turns are marked as lawful due to the extra-wide shoulder. He explained the inexperienced driver making the U-turn thought he was sliding into a ditch and left the truck to make an inspection. Because of the driving conditions, the visibility, the nature of the road and the configuration of the shoulder, he said, an experienced driver would have been able to turn around safely. He attributed the fatalities to mistaken judgement. He said the driver was charged with violations under NRS chapter 706 and with U-turn violations, because there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that gross or criminal negligence was involved, only that simple negligence was involved. Mr. Doyle declared if the provisions of A.B. 185 had been in effect at the time, the driver could have been charged with misdemeanor manslaughter, the fatalities would have been recognized in the charging decision, in the conviction and in the sentencing. Senator James voiced his understanding the penalty will not be increased under A.B. 185. He asked why the driver could not have been sentenced to a jail term by taking the circumstance into consideration without the necessity of changing the law. Mr. Doyle responded: We argued at the time of sentencing the very serious nature of the accident, the fact that there was a double fatality involved. We made all of the right arguments. The judge imposed the sentence that he did. The judge has significant background in dealing with traffic matters, both as a justice of the peace and as a highway patrolman before taking the bench. I cannot speak for the judge, but I can only assume that one of the considerations that entered into the judge's mind in refraining from imposing the jail sentence was the fact that the nature of the charges were vehicle code and commercial carrier code violations, not something delineating the fatalities. I know the judge was aware of the fact that fatalities were involved. And the other consideration in the judge's mind, in my estimation, was the fact that, as far as a criminal history was concerned, there was no significant prior criminal history in this particular case. Mr. Doyle pointed out he has no authority to control sentencing discretion, but he can control the charges which could result in a more significant sentence. Senator James asked how the bill had been amended by the Assembly. Mr. Doyle responded the bill had been amended at lines 15 and 21 to delineate not only NRS chapter 484, motor vehicle code violations, but also NRS chapter 706, motor carrier violations. He explained the latter had been added specifically in response to the testimony by Ms. McGregor, Mr. Sanford, and Russell Swift, the father of the other victim. (Additional written testimony is included in Exhibit D, and Mr. Swift's testimony to the Assembly Committee on Judiciary is attached as Exhibit E.) He opined the addition of NRS chapter 706 violations will make the bill more comprehensive. Senator James wondered if the bill is overrepresentative. He noted the bill will not make a major change. Mr. Doyle concurred, and explained the purpose is to add an additional category at the "bottom end of the culpability scale" for involuntary manslaughter. He reiterated it will enable the charge to recognize the fact of a fatality instead of limiting the charge to motor vehicle code violations. Senator Porter asked for a definition of a simple negligent act. Mr. Doyle replied: A simple negligent act is where you have a duty to act in a careful, prudent manner, and you breach that duty, that breach of the duty results in an actual injury to someone else, and the breach of the duty is both the actual and the proximate cause of the injury that results. Senator Porter asked if the concept of simple negligence applies only to vehicular matters. Mr. Doyle responded the concept is limited to the context of the vehicle code in this case because of the reference to NRS chapters 484 and 706. He explained in a small, rural county such as Douglas County, which is traversed by several major highways, two or three times a year situations arise in which it would be very appropriate to be able to bring a misdemeanor manslaughter charge against someone. He noted district attorneys in some of the larger counties would make more frequent use of such a law. He repeated there is enough of a gap in the criminal code that A.B. 185 will enable such cases to be dealt with in an appropriate manner. Major Dan Hammack, Nevada Highway Patrol, offered support by the NHP for A.B. 185. He agreed the gain to be obtained from the bill will come about from recognition of the severity of the negligent act. He concurred with the opinion expressed by Senator Porter that many minor traffic offenses have a major impact on the motoring public. He noted at present sometimes it is possible only to bring charges for an illegal lane change or failure to stop at a stop sign, the results of which may be catastrophic. Major Hammack opined the inclusion of recognition of the severity of the negligent act will actually act as a deterrent in some motor vehicle cases. Senator Porter declared he has always assumed that if he is negligent he will be held responsible whether it is due to major or simple negligence. He asked if most drivers have the same assumption. Major Hammack replied: It depends.... We have charged involuntary manslaughter in a lot of cases like that where, as the result of misdemeanor traffic violation, and inherently the district attorney's office, not having gross negligence, will not carry that forward. So ... the district attorney's office is reluctant to pursue those without that gross negligent element. Senator Porter explained he was not looking at the law, he was looking at the attitude of the average driver. He reiterated he assumed the person would be charged. He expressed doubt the measure will act as a deterrent, but agreed it will penalize those who should be penalized. Major Hammack voiced agreement that the results of the passage of A.B. 185 will have to be considered after a couple of years to determine whether the penalty should be increased to a gross misdemeanor or felony. In the absence of further testimony, Senator James closed the hearing on A.B. 185 and reopened the hearing on A.B. 186. Judy M. Jacoboni, Lobbyist, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), testified in support of A.B. 186 on behalf of the MADD Lyon County Chapter, of which she is president. Ms. Jacoboni reported the MADD Chapter has been aware of a need for the extension of the definition of "victim." She explained often victims are unable to attend sentencing hearings or speak due to financial considerations, physical barriers that some injury victims cannot overcome, or emotional trauma as a result of victimization. Ms. Jacoboni stated she has been a victims' advocate for 3 1/2 years, and many times she has been asked by victims to speak at sentencing hearings on their behalf. She said she was forced to decline because she does not meet the statutory definition of a victim. She indicated she usually urges victims to write a letter, or she helps in any other way possible. Ms. Jacoboni recalled a situation in Reno in which the mother of a state trooper who was killed by a drunk driver was unable to attend a sentence hearing because she lived out-of-state, while the brother, who lived in Reno, was emotionally unable to attend. The brother asked the trooper's girlfriend to speak, but she did not have status as a victim and thus was unable to do so. Ms. Jacoboni said there was a roomful of coworkers and friends of the trooper who she asserted were victims without status, none of whom could participate. Ms. Jacoboni agreed the "personal representative" should include anyone, including a friend of the family, not just a professional person. David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, Carson City Division Chiefs, Office of the Attorney General, spoke in favor of A.B. 186 as amended by the Assembly on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General. Mr. Sarnowski reported the Office of the Attorney General suggested the term "governmental entity" be included within the expansive definition of victim as set forth on line 3 on the second page of the bill. He pointed out there are instances in which governments are victimized, usually in a white-collar crime context, and the statutes should not preclude those entities from presenting a case at the time of sentencing. Mr. Sarnowski presented a recent opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court (Exhibit F) in which it construed the statute under consideration. He declared the addition of the last two lines on the second page of A.B. 186 was prescient in that the court (in Exhibit F) held that the sentencing judge has wide latitude in allowing the consideration of evidence although it may not meet the strict definition of the statute. He suggested the case cited in Exhibit F, David Michael Wood v. The State of Nevada, will confirm there is no doubt the sentencing court will be allowed to continue to consider relevant evidence. Mr. Sarnowski opined, "I think the case is an example where, if the courts do not allow expansiveness or weren't inclined to do it, you get into parsing." He explained because no death had occurred in the case, the defendant contended the victim's mother was not a "surviving parent" under the present definition of the statute. He felt the defendant tried to "revictimize the victim" in the case, but the trial judge properly allowed the mother to testify, which was affirmed on appeal. He asserted A.B.186 will make that more clear and will eliminate the raising of the issue such as was done by the counsel for the defendant. Senator James declared lines 8 and 9 on the second page will ensure the that court will have latitude. Mr. Sarnowski responded the argument made by counsel in the case cited will be foreclosed by the language of A.B. 186. He approved the statutory statement in the bill which proclaims victims do have a voice and they will not be constrained by legal quibbling. He agreed allowing a personal representative who does not have to be paid will be in keeping with the policy. He surmised if situations arise in which there may be abuse the courts will be able to take appropriate action to limit such activity. Senator Adler asked if the group of people who can receive compensation as victims will be expanded by the bill. Mr. Sarnowski replied he does not believe so, because A.B. 186 only defines who may make a statement at the time of sentencing. Senator James wondered if a "business entity" should be included along with "governmental entity." Mr. Sarnowski recollected that had been discussed in the Assembly hearing. He reported he had suggested language that, without any question, would have included business entities, but the counsel for the Assembly Committee on Judiciary had offered the opinion the word "person" would include a business, as already provided in another statutory definition. In the absence of further testimony, Senator James closed the hearing on A.B. 186 and opened the hearing on A.B. 92. ASSEMBLY BILL 92: Requires revocation of driver's licenses of certain juveniles who drive under influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled substance. Ms. Jacoboni spoke from written testimony (Exhibit G) in support of A.B. 92. She explained the measure is one of four juvenile bills and one resolution resulting from an interim study committee created through a resolution from the Sixty-seventh Session. Ms. Jacoboni explained under A.B. 92 a juvenile found driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor would have his driver's license revoked for 6 months, twice the period imposed upon an adult of 18 or older. She said MADD believes revocation of a license is more appropriate than a jail sentence, and more effective than a fine which may be paid by a parent. Senator James agreed A.B. 92 may have a deterrent effect, but asked how to justify imposing a stiffer penalty on a teenager than on an adult for the same crime. Ms. Jacoboni responded juveniles do not need their licenses as much as older persons who have more obligations. She pointed out younger persons have less experience and hence should be kept off the road for a longer period of time. Senator James asked if it is possible to impose a certain penalty on one class of people, but a different penalty on another class for the same crime. Senator Adler suggested it might become a status offense, such as teenage drinking, and there are many status offenses for juveniles, he said. Ms. Jacoboni interjected all of the judges with whom she discussed the matter felt the revocation should be for an entire year. Senator James questioned what other offenses mandate harsher penalties for juveniles. Ms. Jacoboni responded the reasoning behind imposing a harsher penalty on a juvenile than on an adult is because youth cause more alcoholic crashes, as proven by data. Senator James declared he does not understand the logic and argued the same reasoning would require harsher punishment for teenage murderers than for adult murderers. Ms. Jacoboni replied the logic used by MADD is to remove youthful offenders from the road for as long as possible. She agreed with Senator James that a legal opinion should be obtained regarding different classes of punishment. Senator James inquired if the supreme court has recognized youth discrimination such as has been done regarding age discrimination for older persons. He noted more men than women are involved in accidents and he wondered if male teenagers should have longer suspensions than female teenagers. Ms. Jacoboni said MADD would accept an amendment to impose a 90-day revocation, such as that imposed on adults, in order to save the bill. Senator James remarked he wants to be sure any action will be constitutional even though, he stated, he does not disagree with the policy being proposed. He averred it may be that a longer suspension for adults should be considered if congruity is required. Ms. Jacoboni said there was a similar suggestion made in the Governor's crime bill which will raise the maximum penalty, but with discretion. She pointed out A.B. 92 will not be discretionary, the revocation will be mandatory. Senator Titus asked what the law presently says regarding juvenile DUI. Ms. Jacoboni replied there is no requirement for juveniles to lose their licenses under present statutes and it is left to the discretion of the judge. Senator James acknowledged there is an incapacity provision in the law which allows for juveniles to be punished less harshly for criminal violations than adults. He expressed uncertainty as to whether the incapacity provision works the other way in which juveniles can be treated more harshly. Senator McGinness inquired what procedure is used when a juvenile is stopped for a DUI and whether a parent's permission is necessary to run such tests. Ms. Jacoboni answered she does not know whether field sobriety tests are administered or not, nor whether juveniles are given the same options as adults. She surmised there would have to be proof of DUI. In the absence of further testimony on the matter, Senator James noted it would be discussed in a work session, he closed the hearing on A.B. 92 and adjourned the meeting at 10:15 a.m. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: Judy Jacobs, Committee Secretary APPROVED BY: Senator Mark A. James, Chairman DATE: Senate Committee on Judiciary April 5, 1995 Page