MINUTES OF THE
	ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

	Sixty-eighth Session
	March 10, 1995


The Committee on Judiciary was called to order at 8:15 a.m., on Friday, March 10, 
1995, Chairman Humke presiding in Room 332 of the Legislative Building, Carson 
City, Nevada.  Exhibit A is the Agenda.  Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster.


COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Bernie Anderson, Chairman
Mr. David E. Humke, Chairman
Ms. Barbara E. Buckley, Vice Chairman
Mr. Brian Sandoval, Vice Chairman
Mr. Thomas Batten
Mr. John C. Carpenter
Mr. David Goldwater
Mr. Mark Manendo
Mrs. Jan Monaghan
Ms. Genie Ohrenschall
Mr. Richard Perkins
Mr. Michael A. (Mike) Schneider
Ms. Dianne Steel
Ms. Jeannine Stroth

GUEST LEGISLATORS PRESENT:

None

STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:

Dennis Neilander, Research Analyst
Patty Hicks, Committee Secretary

OTHERS PRESENT:

Mr. Gary L. Stagliano, Chief of Investigations and Recovery, Nevada 	  
	  Welfare Division  


OTHERS PRESENT: (Continued)

Mr. John F. Mendoza, Public Service Commission
Lieutenant Phil Galeoto, Reno Police Department	
Mr. John Hansen, Tort Claims Administrator, Attorney General's Office
Ms. Nancy Tiffany, Nevada Parole and Probation Department
Ms. Susan Campbell, Division of Insurance
Ms. Myla C. Florence, MPA, Administrator, Nevada Welfare Division
Martin J. Roberto, Criminal Investigator, Financial Investigation Unit, Nevada 
	  Welfare Division
Mr. Rick Cypher, Division of Investigation
Mr. Eric Cooper, Nevada Sheriffs and Chiefs Association

Chairman Humke announced Mr. Anderson had some bill introductions to make. 
 Mr. Anderson requested the following bill draft introductions:

BDR 1-461	Summary - provides for appointment of a 
		public defender in juvenile delinquency cases.

ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON  MOVED FOR 
INTRODUCTION OF THIS BILL DRAFT.

ASSEMBLYMAN PERKINS SECONDED THE MOTION.  

THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY BY THOSE 
PRESENT.

BDR 5-1746	Summary - makes various changes 	
		relative to juvenile courts, sentencing, 		
	crime and punishment.

ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON MOVED FOR INTRODUCTION 
OF THE BILL DRAFT.

ASSEMBLYMAN SCHNEIDER SECONDED THE MOTION.  

THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY BY THOSE 
PRESENT.



BDR 16-717	Summary - authorizes sheriff or officers 	
		in charge to refuse to receive into 		
	custody arrested persons  under certain 		
	circumstances.

BDR 14-700	Summary - increases the amount of 		
	administrative assessments from 		
	misdemeanors to cover the cost of 		
	detention facilities.

ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON MOVED FOR INTRODUCTION 
OF THE BILL DRAFTS.

ASSEMBLYMAN SCHNEIDER SECONDED THE MOTION.  

THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY BY THOSE 
PRESENT.

Chairman Humke apprised the public it was the Chair's intention to process four 
bills, A.B. 125, A.B. 132, A.B. 151, and A.B. 2 in that order.  

Mr. Neilander pointed out the four bills referenced in the work session document 
attached as (Exhibit C).

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 125	-	Authorizes juvenile court to place certain 	
					children under supervision of public agency 		
				to work on projects to eradicate graffiti.

Mr. Neilander acknowledged Ms. Ohrenschall as the sponsor of A.B. 125.  There 
has been an amendment to ensure that the juvenile was covered by liability 
insurance when working on these projects.  In committee members' packet a copy 
of N.R.S. 176.087, subsection 3, the language could be crafted into A.B. 125 to 
alleviate the concerns about liability insurance.  It also entails related issues on 
SIIS.  There are two alternatives to consider: 1) take A.B. 125 and tie it into this 
statute; or 2) list subsection 3 from N.R.S. 176.087 with modification and amend 
into A.B. 125.  



ASSEMBLYMAN OHRENSCHALL MOVED TO AMEND 
A.B. 125 BY LISTING LANGUAGE IN N.R.S. 176.087, 
SECTION 3, AND DO PASS.

ASSEMBLYMAN MANENDO SECONDED THE MOTION.

THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY BY THOSE 
PRESENT.

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 132	-	Eliminates certain crimes relating to federal 	
					food stamps.

Mr. Neilander advised the purpose of this bill was to bring state law into 
compliance with Federal law.  Federal law no longer refers to "authorization to 
purchase" and the bill removed that language from existing Nevada law.  In addition 
the Welfare Division and Division of Investigation have submitted an amendment 
the committee reviewed previously inserting p. 1, l. 11, "sells or purchases" to read 
  "Any person  who knowingly uses, transfers, sells or purchases".   The bill allows 
for aggregation of value for separate offenses to above $250 which would make 
it a felony rather than a misdemeanor offense.  An exception to the felony penalty 
is for violators who exchange food stamps for money in order to purchase 
necessary goods or services that are generally not available using food stamps, 
e. g. diapers.  

If the new aggregation language does pass, Ms. Buckley offered an amendment 
that if the person exchanged food stamps for personal use it would be a 
misdemeanor.  If person were using this method to obtain drugs, it should remain 
a felony.  If the person exchanged food stamps for food under $250 it would be 
a misdemeanor.  

Chairman Humke commented it may require an intent requirement or lack of intent 
that would have to be shown by a person rightfully using food stamps for diapers, 
nonfood items, but not drugs.  

Ms. Steel proposed the language of selling the food stamps, if it is determined by 
the judge in his discretion that the purchase was for necessary personal items, it 
would be a mitigating circumstance to take it from a felony to a misdemeanor.



ASSEMBLYMAN CARPENTER MOVED TO AMEND AND DO 
PASS TO ADD SELLS AND PURCHASES AND DOES NOT 
INCLUDE AGGREGATION.

ASSEMBLYMAN BUCKLEY SECONDED THE MOTION.

Under discussion, Mr. Perkins stated he could not support the motion due to 
testimony received from Nevada Division of Investigations trying to accomplish the 
cracking down of black market in food stamps.  

Ms. Monaghan requested clarification of aggregation.  Mr. Neilander referenced  
p. 2 of the amendment which provides: if the separate acts were committed within 
a six month period, then the acts could be compiled together; or if none of the 
individual acts were a felony.   Subparagraph c. is the aggregation part: the 
cumulative value of all of the violations is sufficient to make the offense punishable 
as a felony.  It means if the cumulative value exceeds $250, it is considered a 
felony.  Essentially, subsection 5 of the amendment is the aggregation of values.

Mr. Anderson expressed concern without the secondary amendment, the effects 
of the $250 may not achieve the objective of the bill.  Mr. Neilander explained that 
if a motion were adopted as stated, it will bring the current law into compliance 
with Federal law.  The aggregation amendment is not part of the amendments that 
were made to Federal law.  The misdemeanor threshold will remain at $250 and 
a felony above that.  

Ms. Steel asked if the state can make its laws tougher than federal statutes.  
Mr. Neilander nodded in approval.

Mr. Sandoval expressed his concern and stated he cannot support the motion.  He 
felt if we were unable to aggregate those who manipulate the system by 
exchanging food stamps for money several times a day or week are only subject 
to a misdemeanor.  It opens a loophole in the statute that will be taken advantage 
of of time after time.  


Ms. Buckley clarified her position.  There are abusers of food stamps using it as 
black market trading in thousands of dollars.  They would already be covered by the 
existing bill and it would be a felony.  Her concern is that an individual who trades 
food stamps for ability to buy diapers or a homeless person trying to buy food 
should not be charged with a felony and take up a prison bed.  In the food stamp 
law, they are automatically charged with intentional program violation; terminated 
from the food stamp program for six months; and, charged with a misdemeanor. 
 Felony beds should be reserved for violent offenders and not for people who trade 
food stamps for diapers.  For that reason, she supported the motion as it is.  

Mr. Batten indicated support for Mr. Sandoval and Mr. Perkins' viewpoints.  The 
problem he foresees if you take it individually, you will have numerous 
misdemeanors.  He believed if you have it combined for a felony offense, a 
conviction could be secured more easily.  As far as the homeless situation 
Ms. Buckley made reference to, he realized prison bed space should be saved for 
violent criminals, homeless people should work.

Mr. Anderson is convinced the committee has the ability to narrowly draw this 
amendment to conform with the Federal statute.  He was concerned about keeping 
prison beds open for those violent offenders and not perpetuate the concept of 
open door.  You put them in and they take them right back out again.  The 
homeless obviously we would like to take them off the street.  Mr. Anderson 
expressed support for Mr. Carpenter's proposed amendment.  

As an authority on diapers, Ms. Steel remarked they do not cost more than $250. 
 Some violators are purchasing drugs and abusers of the program need to be 
stopped.  With the mitigating circumstances, she did not feel a judge would put a 
mother who needed diapers in jail.  The aggregation of values is needed for repeat 
violators.  

Ms. Monaghan commented the motion is for the amendment of sell and purchase, 
she felt it does not go far enough.  She could not support the bill unless the 
aggregation of values is included.  

Mr. Perkins did not perceive any indigent would fall into this category for several 
reasons: 1) discretion at law enforcement level; and 2) discretion at the judge's 
level.  The inability to prove a crime because you cannot prove the aggregate as 
well with an indigent person as you might with someone who is black marketing 
these coupons.  Mr. Perkins did not see a judge sentencing someone whose only 
crime in life is being poor, to occupy a prison bed which would be better occupied 
by someone who committed a violent act.


Ms. Ohrenschall inquired what the intent of the legislative history was and if this 
issue was considered.  Mr. Neilander advised this was an amendment to the Food 
Stamp Act of 1964 which became 1977, as amended.  It was not known if 
aggregation was part of the discussion when authorization to purchase was 
removed.  We have no statistical input from the federal hearings.

Mr. Carpenter advised the reason he did not include the aggregation of values in his 
motion is because he did not believe it was being changed.  In reading the bill, the 
$250 remains a felony.  "Authorization to purchase" is being deleted and "sells and 
purchases inserted."    Chairman Humke recalled from previous testimony that this 
change was needed to provide better law enforcement.  The bill as presented by 
the State Welfare Division provided for their changes to comport with Federal law. 
 As testimony unfolded, it became apparent that many persons were working the 
system, so as to stay under the $250 limit.  On a felony threshold, it is clearly a 
state limitation.  

Ms. Steel reiterated the Chairman's comments.  If you have a violator abusing the 
system for a cumulative total of $250, a felony can be charged instead of a 
misdemeanor for each separate offense.  

Chairman Humke declared there is a motion by Assemblyman Carpenter, seconded 
by Assemblyman Buckley, to amend and do pass generally following the 
amendments as outlined by research staff with the exception of the aggregation 
provision.  Chairman Humke inquired before we proceed if an amendment of the 
motion is desired to include the aggregation provision.

ASSEMBLYMAN STEEL MOVED TO AMEND THE MOTION 
 TO INCLUDE THE AGGREGATION PROVISION.

ASSEMBLYMAN BATTEN SECONDED THE MOTION.

THE MOTION CARRIED.  (ASSEMBLYMEN ANDERSON, 
BUCKLEY, CARPENTER VOTED NO, ALL OTHERS VOTED 
YES.)

Mr. Anderson asked if the amended version was to include the cleanup language 
recommended, for example, as amended l. 7, to include certificates or devices and 
the sells and purchase language; and, the value of all food coupon stamp 
certificates or access devices, credits that misappropriated in separate acts of food 
stamps.  All of this language would then become the language in whole or in part. 
 Mr. Neilander responded affirmatively.  

Chairman Humke referred to the work session document, last paragraph on first 
page, providing an exception to the felony penalty for violators, requested 
Mr. Neilander to clarify if the motion on the floor does not include that provision. 
 Mr. Neilander responded affirmatively.  

Ms. Steel stated it was her intent to include the provision of an exception to the 
felony penalty for violators who exchange food stamps for money in order to 
purchase necessary goods or services available using food stamps.  Mr. Batten, 
seconder of the motion, agreed to this inclusion.  

Mr. Carpenter stated with the clarification of the amended motion, he could not 
support this motion.  He felt a program of food should not be carried over to other 
areas, such as clothing, rent, etc.

Mr. Sandoval desired more clarification as to the application or effect of this new 
provision.  Mr. Neilander advised he was going to meet with the bill drafter to 
formulate the language for the amendment.  The committee will review the 
amendment before it goes to the floor.  He will discuss with the bill drafter to 
develop an exception for those persons charged with a felony who were trading 
food stamps for personal goods  not available under the Food Stamp Program.  

Mr. Sandoval was concerned with preempting federal law.  Mr. Neilander explained 
that the $250 threshold is a state regulation. 

Mr. Carpenter surmised if one really needed a car to go to work, the car is a 
necessity, so food stamps are traded in for a car.  

Ms. Steel pointed out the judge would have discretion on this mitigating 
circumstance.  

Based on the full, frank, and free discussion, Chairman Humke asked if the motion 
needed further consideration.  The Chairman advised the motion is to amend and 
do pass.  The motion has already been amended and called for the question.

THE MOTION CARRIED.  (ASSEMBLYMAN CARPENTER 
AND ANDERSON VOTED NO, ALL OTHERS VOTED YES.)

Ms. Buckley was asked to handle A.B. 132 on the floor.  


Chairman Humke requested the committee to give Mr. Neilander the opportunity 
to complete his presentation on proposed amendments.

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 151	-	Requires criminal defendant to 
						serve notice to district attorney 
						of witnesses defendant intends 
						to call at trial and allows 	
					criminal defendant and district 	
					attorney to discover certain 	
					matters.


Mr. Neilander advised A.B. 151 is a reciprocal discovery providing defendants must 
provide a list not less than 30 days before trial of the names of all witnesses and 
expert witnesses.  There were a number of amendments suggested.  He briefly 
went through those in the work session document.

ASSEMBLYMAN STEEL MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS 
A.B. 151 AND THAT LANGUAGE BE FORMULATED THAT 
THE EVIDENCE TO BE DISCLOSED IS THE EVIDENCE THAT 
HAS BEEN COLLECTED AT THE TIME; AND, INSERT P.1, 
L. 6 AND P.2, L. 40, THE WORD, "KNOWN"; ALSO, ADD 
AT P. 2, L. 45, THAT DEFENDANT INTENDS TO USE AT 
TRIAL; AND, P. 1, L. 3, INSERT 21 DAYS.

ASSEMBLYMAN STROTH SECONDED THE MOTION.

Under discussion Ms. Buckley expressed her concerns about the number of cases 
handled by the public defender's office.  Testimony showed more cases are 
handled and they hire less attorneys because the cases will be plea bargained.  If 
all cases went to trial, a great deal of additional work would need to be done for 
trial preparation.  She supports other portions of this bill.  With regard to supplying 
information 21 days in advance of trial for the list of witnesses the defendant 
intends to have testify at the trial, she cannot support.  

Ms. Steel commented the 21-day time limit for disclosure may cause some cases 
to settle earlier than the trial date.  It is important for both sides to be aware of the 
status of their cases in order to make a proper disposition of the case.



Mr. Sandoval expressed his concern regarding the 21-day time limit for disclosure. 
 The insertion of "known" does not put a burden on the defense bar because they 
only have to disclose witnesses they know.  Later on if it does indeed come to trial 
and they learn of more, they can disclose more witnesses later.

Ms. Monaghan expressed her support of the amendments to the bill.  She would 
have a concern if it did not have a time limit because it does stimulate activity to 
resolve a case.  

In regard to Mr. Sandoval's suggestion of insertion of the word "known," Ms. 
Buckley stated it would still require the public defender's office to review and 
prepare the case for trial.  With regard to the suggestion of deleting the time limit, 
she would support a requirement that the judge order the disclosure so a motion 
would not have to be prepared.  Further, she suggested this bill be referred to a 
subcommittee.  

Ms. Steel restated attorneys need a time limit.  To have a judge make a ruling in 
every single case, she thought it was unreasonable.  The 21-day time limit is not 
unreasonable.  

Mr. Anderson requested clarification on 21 calendar days or court days time limit. 
 Chairman Humke advised it meant 21 calendar days which excludes holidays.  Mr. 
Anderson proposed a change at l. 3 to delete "not less than 30 days before trial or" 
to read "defendant shall, at such time as the court may direct file and serve upon 
the district attorney a written notice containing."

ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON MOVED TO AMEND THE 
MOTION TO DELETE AT LINE 3, "NOT LESS THAN 30 
DAYS BEFORE TRIAL OR", TO READ "DEFENDANT SHALL, 
AT SUCH TIME AS THE COURT MAY DIRECT FILE AND 
SERVE UPON THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY A WRITTEN 
NOTICE CONTAINING."

ASSEMBLYMAN GOLDWATER SECONDED THE MOTION.


Under discussion, Ms. Stroth reminded the committee of the public defender's 
testimony, who stated belief in full discovery and supported the bill; but, had a 
concern with the 30-day time limit.  The compromise of 21-day time limit was 
acceptable to the public defender in S.B. 166.  Ms. Stroth urged the committee to 
support the 21-day time limit amendment to the bill. 

Mr. Anderson advised the purpose of the amendment was not to disregard Senate's 
action but rather the courts in the two major jurisdictions would develop an 
administrative rule of practice.  It is a way of adjusting it to fit the needs of a 
particular jurisdiction and may cut down on the fiscal impact.  

Ms. Buckley in reviewing S.B. 166 noted the information required within 21 days 
 related only to expert witnesses.  If the first portion of A.B. 151 was to use the 
Senate's language which refers to expert witnesses, she would support that 
amendment.  

Chairman Humke commented S.B. 166 has been mentioned.  Perhaps it was the 
Chair's mistake to allow mention of S.B. 166 at the earlier hearing, but the reason 
why this committee will move on A.B. 151 is because co-chairmen have agreed it 
should be voted on.  They felt it did not warrant a subcommittee assignment.  
Chairman Humke reminded members there are two independent pieces of 
legislation.  Despite action on another piece of legislation, presently before the 
committee is A.B. 151.

Ms. Ohrenschall requested clarification of the motion on the floor.  Mr. Neilander 
clarified the motion before the committee is an amendment to the main motion. 
 The main motion was to include the "known" insertion and include "that the 
defendant intends to use" and change it to "21 days."  The current motion is to 
include the "known" insertion, include "that the defendant intends to use" and 
strike the change to "21 days", and instead insert "that the defendant shall, at 
such time as the court may direct, file and serve upon the district attorney a 
written notice containing. . ."  He understood this proposal was to amend the main 
motion.  Chairman Humke agreed with that description.  

Mr. Perkins advised he could support Mr. Anderson's motion, but it would require 
some additional language to fulfill his intent.   In order for the courts to establish 
their own time limit, they need direction to do so.  

Mr. Anderson withdrew his proposed amendment to the main motion and proposed 
another with seconder's permission.  Mr. Goldwater responded affirmatively.  



ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON MOVED TO AMEND THE 
MOTION TO REQUIRE 21-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR KNOWN 
EXPERT WITNESSES AND 5 WORKING DAYS TIME LIMIT 
FOR PERCIPIENT WITNESSES.

ASSEMBLYMAN GOLDWATER SECONDED THE MOTION.

Mr. Neilander clarified the main motion for the committee.  

Ms. Steel stated she cannot support this amendment.  In trial preparation case and 
names of witnesses are known 21 days in advance there may be included an alibi 
witness who is not an expert witness.  It changes the whole flavor of the situation. 
 The prosecution needs to know there is an alibi witness and may desire to plea 
bargain.  Ms. Steel stressed 21-day time limit for disclosure was not unreasonable. 
 As witnesses become known, names are furnished as they accumulate.  

Mr. Carpenter advised he cannot support the motion.  He thought the five-day limit 
was too short, and 21-days was a good compromise.  

Ms. Ohrenschall observed that a split time frame tends to be awkward and difficult 
for offices to comply with. 

Ms. Monaghan requested clarification between 21 calendar days and five working 
days.  Mr. Anderson replied it was his understanding the five would be working 
days, actual court days, where the 21 is calendar days.  The five-day rule she was 
uncomfortable with.  However, if it could be extended to ten days, she could 
support that.  

Mr. Sandoval stated he was uncomfortable with two time limits in one statute.  He 
thought this was a potential for confusion.  He suggested a compromise to increase 
the five days to 10-14 calendar days.  


Seeing no further discussion, Chairman Humke requested Mr. Neilander to restate 
Mr. Anderson's motion.  Mr. Neilander replied the motion is to amend the main 
motion and the amendment would now be 21 calendar days for expert witnesses 
and five working days, excluding holidays and weekends, for other percipient 
witnesses; add the language of "known" as it relates to witnesses;  add the 
language, "that the defendant intends to use" on p.2., l. 45.  In addition, it would 
also include the existing language, "or at such other time as the court may direct." 
 Seeing no further discussion on the motion by Mr. Anderson, the motion to amend 
by Mr. Anderson, seconded by Mr. Goldwater, Chairman Humke acknowledged 
Mr. Perkins.

In dealing with criminal courts, Mr. Perkins stated Mr. Anderson's proposed 
amendment to the bill is workable.  Often high volume cases handled either at the 
public defender's or district attorney's level do not get the time and attention until 
the last week before trial unless it is an exceptional case.  If it is a very large case, 
then work is done farther ahead.  The amendment provides for a simple discovery. 
 Five working days still allows for the trial and defense attorneys to determine if the 
case is worthy of proceeding to trial.  

Ms. Steel requested consideration of the 8,000-9,000 cases processed yearly.  
Now instead of handling them once on a 21-day procedure, they have to be 
handled twice.  It will impact attorneys to have a double day for disclosure.  This 
is deviating from the goal to streamline the time limits.  As a result the workload 
will become heavier.  For this reason, she cannot support a double day standard. 
It is not beneficial for the people who work in the criminal justice system.

Ms. Ohrenschall concurred with Ms. Steel and Mr. Sandoval.  Legal 
paraprofessionals have the burden of complying with notices.  She stated this 
procedure would create extra work and confusion with two different time 
standards.  

Ms. Buckley agreed with the comments about the double standard.  The only 
reason she supports the amendment was the testimony heard from the district 
attorneys and public defender's office.  In reality, the only cases requiring expert 
witnesses are capital cases or high profile cases where both sides anticipate going 
to trial.  The every day burglary cases or the plea bargain cases usually do not have 
an expert witness.  For those reasons she was comfortable with the double 
standard in this particular bill, whereas she may not be in other bills.  

Mr. Goldwater concurred with Ms. Buckley's statements.  There is no problem with 
the amendment.  These are attorneys who made it through four years of education 
and three years of law school.  He imagined nobody would object if you make 
attorneys work a little harder.  


Ms. Steel remarked while it is humorous to talk about extra work for attorneys; 
however, we also do not have a high regard for attorneys when a defendant gets 
off on a technicality.  The technicality happens to be that a calendar day was 
missed.  This amendment needs further consideration because it impacts over 
8,000 cases.  Even though Ms. Buckley indicated that only the high profile cases 
have expert witnesses, it is not necessarily the truth.  Sometimes very small cases 
may require a fingerprint expert witness to determine the defendant's guilt.  Ms. 
Steel stressed 21-day time limit for disclosure needs to be instituted.

Ms. Ohrenschall agreed with Ms. Steel regarding expert witnesses in low profile 
cases are required and not just the landmark cases.  

Mr. Batten concurred with Ms. Steel's and Ms. Ohrenschall's comments.  If a 
person challenges a breathalyser results in a DUI offense, an expert witness is 
required.   This is a very small case as compared to a rape, robbery, or homicide. 
 Another layer of cumbersome requirements will be added with this amendment.

Ms. Ohrenschall added she has personally seen trivial cases use expert witnesses; 
 either because the defendant wanted to keep his record clean or had an axe to 
grind or may have had some particular status that would have been impacted by 
having a certain type of misdemeanor on his record.  These cases are a common 
occurrence.  

Chairman Humke asked if the motion on the floor was understood and requested 
Mr. Neilander to restate the motion on the floor.  He responded the motion on the 
floor is a motion to amend the main motion.  The main motion contains the addition 
of the word "known" and "that the defendant intends to use. . ." This motion 
would amend the main motion by also requiring a 21-day notice for expert 
witnesses and a five-day notice for nonexpert witnesses.  Mr. Anderson confirmed 
 Mr. Neilander's statement.  The two limits for disclosure were suggested by Mr. 
Anderson to be voted on separately.  Chairman Humke advised this request will 
have to be in the form of a motion.

ASSEMBLYMAN ANDERSON MOVED TO DIVIDE THE 
MOTION SO THAT THE 21-DAY LIMIT FOR DISCLOSURE 
ONLY APPLY TO EXPERT WITNESSES.

ASSEMBLYMAN GOLDWATER SECONDED THE MOTION.




Mr. Anderson explained the 21-day limit shall only apply to expert witnesses.  Then 
the secondary question would be whether there should be a second time limit for 
the percipient witnesses.  He reasoned the two limits should be dealt with 
separately.  

Ms. Ohrenschall requested clarification on the new motion.  If a vote is polled on 
whether the 21-day limit applies only to expert or nonexpert witnesses, then would 
the five-day limit be deleted?  Mr. Anderson indicated it was correctly stated.

Mr. Carpenter remarked this was getting very confusing.  The previous motion on 
the floor must be acted upon before another motion could proceed.  The second 
motion of Mr. Anderson was not understood.  Under the 21-day limit it would 
include both expert and precipient witnesses.  

Chairman Humke declared a short 10-minute recess.  The Chair recognized 
Mr. Anderson for the following motion:

MR. ANDERSON WITHDREW HIS REQUEST TO DIVIDE 
THE MOTION.  

Mr. Neilander restated the motion of Mr. Anderson dealing with 21-day limit for 
expert witnesses, five calendar days for other witnesses, and the other 
amendments as proposed in the work session document.  His motion was to 
change the one section of the main motion.  Chairman Humke confirmed the 
original motion, minus the secondary motion to bifurcate that particular motion. 
 Chairman Humke asked if everyone understood the motion.  It is now Mr. 
Anderson's motion, seconded by Mr. Goldwater.

THE MOTION FAILED.  (ASSEMBLYMAN SANDOVAL, 
STROTH, STEEL, OHRENSCHALL, MONAGHAN, 
MANENDO, BATTEN, CARPENTER, AND HUMKE VOTED 
NO, ALL OTHERS VOTED YES.)

Chairman Humke requested if there was any further discussion on the main motion.

Mr. Anderson expressed his intention to vote for the main motion because there is 
a need for disclosure.  



There being no additional discussion, Chairman Humke called the question of those 
in favor of amend and do pass A.B. 151.

THE MOTION CARRIED.  (ASSEMBLYMAN BUCKLEY 
VOTED NO, ALL OTHERS VOTED YES.)

Chairman Humke announced A.B. 151 has been amended and has a do pass 
recommendation.  Assemblyman Stroth was assigned to handle the bill on the 
floor.  

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2	-	Reduces period during which cause of action to 
					recover damages for personal injury or wrongful 
					death may be commenced.

Mr. Neilander advised this measure would if enacted reduce the current statute of 
limitations from two years to one year.  

Chairman Humke advised a letter of support from the Attorney General's Office 
was being distributed, attached as (Exhibit D).  

Based upon previous testimony, Mr. Carpenter made the following motion:

ASSEMBLYMAN CARPENTER MOVED TO INDEFINITELY 
POSTPONE A.B. 2.

ASSEMBLYMAN BUCKLEY SECONDED THE MOTION.

Under discussion Mr. Batten stated he could not support the motion.  One of the 
reasons why the Attorney General's Office desired the reduction was the turnover 
of employees with Department of Prisons.  Frivolous lawsuits not only cost time 
in court but taxpayer's money to support and defend these lawsuits.  The advice 
of the Attorney General should be adhered to.

Ms. Monaghan stated she also could not support postponement of this bill.  
Although it is a difficult issue, the committee could handle it.  


Ms. Steel expressed her intention to make a motion to amend and reduce one year 
the statute of limitation in actions if the state is a defendant but lacked support of 
the committee.  Rather than lose this legislation, it was better to indefinitely 
postpone the bill.  Should a two-thirds majority of the committee be in favor of this 
 amendment after discussion, the bill can be brought back onto the floor for a vote. 
 
Mr. Batten requested permission to support an amendment to the bill.  Chairman 
Humke stated he would accept a motion.  Chairman Humke apologized to Mr. 
Batten and advised it is not appropriate for the Chair to accept a motion to amend 
an indefinitely postponed motion.  He further advised Mr. Batten his motion would 
be appropriate for a do pass motion or amend and do pass motion.  

There being no additional discussion, Chairman Humke called the question of those 
in favor of indefinitely postponing A.B. 2

THE MOTION CARRIED.  (ASSEMBLYMEN STROTH, 
MONAGHAN AND BATTEN VOTED NO, ALL OTHERS 
VOTED YES.)

There being no further business to come before committee, the meeting adjourned 
at 10:16 a.m.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:



	
Patty Hicks,
Committee Secretary

APPROVED BY:




Assemblyman David E. Humke, Chairman




Assemblyman Bernie Anderson, Chairman
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
March 10, 1995
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